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Abstract
I discuss the design of the method of entropic inference as a general
framework for reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. The main con-
tribution of this discussion is to emphasize the pragmatic elements in the
derivation. More specifically: (1) Probability theory is designed as the
uniquely natural tool for representing states of incomplete information.
(2) An epistemic notion of information is defined in terms of its rela-
tion to the Bayesian beliefs of ideally rational agents. (3) The method of
updating from a prior to a posterior probability distribution is designed
through an eliminative induction process that singles out the logarithmic
relative entropy as the unique tool for inference. The resulting framework
includes as special cases both MaxEnt and Bayes’ rule. It therefore uni-
fies entropic and Bayesian methods into a single general inference scheme.
I find that similar pragmatic elements are an integral part of Putnam’s
internal realism, of Floridi’s informational structural realism, and also of
van Fraasen’s empiricist structuralism. I conclude with the conjecture
that their valuable insights can be incorporated into a single coherent
doctrine — an informational pragmatic realism.
1 Introduction: an informational realism
The awareness that the concepts of truth and reality are central to science is
quite old. In contrast, the recognition that the notion of information is cen-
tral too is still in its infancy which makes Floridi’s Philosophy of Information
particularly timely [1]. I find much to agree with his the development of a
method of levels of abstraction, the adoption of the semantic model of theories,
the valuable guidance provided by singling out 18 open problems, including the
defence of an informational structural realism (see also [2]). Most importantly,
Floridi’s whole argument displays a certain pragmatic attitude that I find most
appealing:1
∗Invited paper published in the Special Issue on “Luciano Floridi and the Philosophy of
Information”, Mind and Machines 24, 37-70 (2014).
1The Perceian slant of Floridi’s pragmatism is perhaps more explicit in [3] and [4].
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“The mind does not wish to acquire information for its own sake. It needs
information to defend itself from reality and survive. So information is not
about representing the world: it is rather a means to model it in such a
way to make sense of it and withstand its impact.” ([1], p. xiv)
However, Floridi and I approach our subject – information – from different di-
rections. Floridi is motivated by developments in computer science and artificial
intelligence while I am mostly concerned with physics. One might therefore ex-
pect important differences and, indeed, there are many. For example, Floridi
offers no discussion of Bayesian and entropic methods of inference which are
the main theme of this paper. Nevertheless, rather than contradictory, I find
that our approaches are sufficiently different that, in the end, they may actually
complement each other.
The connection between information and physics is natural: throughout we
will adopt the view that science consists in using information about the world for
the purpose of predicting, modeling, explaining and/or controlling phenomena
of interest to us. If this image turns out to be even remotely accurate then we
might expect that the laws of science would reflect, at least to some extent, the
methods for manipulating information. We can, moreover, entertain the radical
hypothesis that the relation between physics and nature is considerably more
indirect than usually assumed: the laws of physics are nothing but schemes for
processing information about nature. The evidence supporting this latter notion
is already quite considerable: most of the formal structures of thermodynamics
and statistical mechanics [5], and also of quantum theory (see e.g. [6][7][8] and
references therein) have been derived as examples of the methods of inference
discussed later in this paper.
The basic difficulty is that inferences must be made on the basis of infor-
mation that is usually incomplete and one must learn to handle uncertainty.
Indeed, to the extent that “reality” is ultimately unknowable the incomplete-
ness of information turns out to be the norm rather than the exception —
which explains why statistical descriptions such as we find in quantum mechan-
ics are unavoidable. The gods do play dice. And this is not surprising: from
the informational perspective indeterminism is natural and demands no further
explanation. Instead, what needs to be explained is why in some special and
peculiar circumstances one obtains the illusion of determinism.
The objective of the present paper is to describe the method of entropic
inference as a general framework for reasoning under conditions of uncertainty.
The main contribution of the discussion is to emphasize the pragmatic elements
in the derivation. The application of entropic methods to derive laws of physics
will not be pursued here. Instead, we will tackle three problems. First, we
describe how a scheme is designed to represent one’s state of partial knowledge2
as a web of interconnected beliefs with no internal inconsistencies; the tools
to do it are probabilities [9][10]. Since the source of all difficulties is the lack
2For our purposes we do not need to be particularly precise about the meaning of the
term ‘knowledge’. Note however that under a pragmatic conception of truth there is no real
difference between a ‘justified belief’ and the more explicit but redundant ‘justified true belief’.
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of complete information two other issues must inevitably be addressed. One
concerns information itself: what, after all, is information? The other issue
is: what if we are fortunate and some information does come our way, what
do we do with it? We discuss the design of a scheme for updating the web of
beliefs. It turns out that the instrument for updating is uniquely singled out to
be entropy3 — from which these entropic methods derive their name. [8] The
resulting framework includes as special cases both Jaynes’ MaxEnt and Bayes’
rule. It therefore unifies entropic and Bayesian methods into a single general
and manifestly consistent inference scheme.4
In the final discussion I point out that closely related pragmatic elements can
be found in Putnam’s internal realism [11], in Floridi’s informational structural
realism [2] and also in van Fraasen’s more recent empiricist structuralism [12]. It
might therefore be possible to pursue the systematic development of a position
– an informational pragmatic realism – that takes advantage of the valuable
insights achieved in those three doctrines.
2 Background: the tensions within realism
Scientific realism means different things to different people but most scientific
realists would probably agree that (1) there exists a real world out there that
is largely independent of our thoughts, language and point of view; and (2) and
that one goal of science is to provide descriptions of what the world is really
like. van Fraasen, who is not himself a realist, describes this form of realism as
follows:
“Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the
world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that
it is true.” [13]
There is a tension between theses (1) and (2): Can we ever know that our
scientific descriptions are true, that is, that they match or correspond to reality?
To put it bluntly, is science at all possible?
One solution to this skeptical challenge is an empiricism that accepts thesis
(1) of an independent external reality, but denies thesis (2) that we can actually
get to know and describe it. This is a type of anti-realism. In such a philosophy
true descriptions are not likely and science, if it is to succeed, must strive towards
a more modest goal. According to van Fraasen’s constructive empiricism
3Strictly the tool for updating is relative entropy. However, as we shall later see, all
entropies are relative to some prior and therefore the qualifier relative is redundant and can be
dropped. This is somewhat analogous to the situation with energy: it is implicitly understood
that all energies are relative to some reference frame but there is no need to constantly refer
to a relative energy.
4I make no attempt to provide a review of the literature on entropic inference. The following
incomplete list reflects only some contributions that are directly related to the particular
approach described in this paper: [8], [10], [14], [15], [16], [17], and [18].
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“Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and ac-
ceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate.”
[13]
The skeptical challenge also leads to a different kind of tension. On one hand
all past scientific theories have turned out to be false and therefore it is natural
to infer that our best current theories will turn out to be false too — this is the
pessimistic meta-induction argument. And if all theories are ultimately false,
why, then, do we even bother to do science?
On the other hand our current theories are extremely successful. How can
this be? It seems that the only possible explanation is that our theories do
indeed capture something right about reality — this is the no-miracles argument.
Indeed, as Putnam puts it:
“The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that
doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.” ([19], p.73)
The tension can be resolved through a compromise: our theories are right in
some respects, which explains their present success, and wrong in others, which
will explain their future failures.
In constructing new theories it would be very helpful if we could know ahead
of time which are the features in our current theories that ought to be preserved
and which discarded. The position known as structural realism claims to have
such knowledge. It asserts that what science somehow manages to track faith-
fully is the mathematical structure that describes relations among entities while
the intrinsic nature of these entities remains largely unknown. Thus, structural
realism (belief in a true description of structure) is intermediate between a full-
blown realism (belief in a true description of both structure and ontology) and
a skeptical empiricism (belief only in empirical adequacy). Unfortunately, the
question of drawing a clear distinction between what constitutes intrinsic na-
ture and what constitutes structure is tricky; it is not even clear that such a
distinction can be drawn at all.
There are many other attempted answers — none fully successful yet — and
the literature on these topics is enormous. (See e.g. [20], [21].) There are two
possible directions of research that are relevant to the theme of this paper. They
arise from recognizing the central roles played by the notion of ‘truth’ (and its
related cousin ‘reality’) and of ‘information’. Clearly, different notions of ‘true’
and ‘real’ and of ‘information’ will affect how we decide what is ‘true’ and what
is ‘real’ and of how ‘information’ will help us make those decisions.
3 Pragmatic realism
The notion of truth adopted in scientific realism, in structural realism, and in
constructive empiricism is a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth; true statements
are claimed to enjoy a special relation to reality: they match it or correspond
to it. Unfortunately the precise nature of such correspondence is not clear.
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For, in order to say that a description matches reality, we need to compare
that description with something, and for us this something can only be another
description. Reality-in-itself remains forever inaccessible.
Pragmatism represents a break with this notion. There are several notions
of pragmatic truth – and they are not free from controversy either. The central
element is a concern with the practical effectiveness of ideas as tools for achieving
our purposes, a concern with whether we ought to believe in them or not, with
their justification. I think there is much here that can be appropriated and
suitably modified to do science:
Truth is a useful idealization. True statements are those that would be
fully accepted – that is, believed – by ideally rational agents under ideal
epistemic conditions.
And, just as for other conceptual idealizations in science – such as inertial
frames, thermal equilibrium, rigid bodies and frictionless planes – the fact that
they are never attainable in practice does not in the least detract from their
usefulness. In fact, the notion of truth is most useful when left a bit vague.
‘True’ is the compliment we pay to an idea when we are fairly certain that it is
working adequately. ‘True’ is an idea we can trust. And there need be nothing
too permanent about truth either; if we discover that the idea is no longer
working so well, then we just withdraw the compliment and say “I was wrong; I
thought it was true but it wasn’t.” We do this all the time. There is no reason
why all those features of truth that are embodied in the correspondence model
should be preserved; in a truly pragmatic account we just need to preserve what
is useful.
In a pragmatic approach all pragmatic virtues, and not just empirical ade-
quacy, contribute to the assessment of truth:5
Science aims to give us theories that are useful for the purposes of de-
scription, explanation, prediction, control, etc.; the acceptance of a theory
involves the conviction that the theory is indeed useful.
To put it bluntly science does indeed aim to give us theories that are true —
but the aim is for pragmatic truth. Such truth is objective in the sense that
a statement that fails to be empirically adequate — and therefore not useful
for predictions, control, etc. — is objectively false. Moreover, being objective
does no mean independent of us. The presumably true propositions derive their
meaning from the theory or conceptual framework in which they are embedded;
a framework that is designed by us for our purposes.
The notion of truth is related to that of reality. Putnam, who rejects the
label ‘pragmatist’ for himself but is nevertheless called a ‘neo-pragmatist’ by
others, calls his position an internal realism because the question
“...what objects does the world consist of? is a question that only makes
sense to ask within a theory or description.” [23]
5[22] gives a similar pragmatic position which emphasizes explanatory power.
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He further explains that
“In an internalist view ... signs do not intrinsically correspond to objects,
independently of how those objects are employed and by whom. But a sign
that is actually employed in a particular way by a particular community of
users can correspond to particular objects within the conceptual scheme of
those users. ‘Objects’ do not exist independently of conceptual schemes.
We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme
of description. Since the objects and the signs are alike internal to the
scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what.” [11]
Ironically, realists who favor a correspondence theory of truth would rightfully
classify internal realism and any other pragmatic realism as forms of anti-
realism.
We can be more explicit: it is we who supply the concepts of chairs and
tables but, once the concepts are in place, whether the object in front of me
is a table or a chair is a matter of objective fact about which my (subjective)
judgements can be (objectively) wrong. It is in this sense that this doctrine is
a realism — there really is a chair in front of me — but it is pragmatic realism
in that the concept of chair is invented by us for our purposes and designs.
And atoms are as real as chairs. In the middle ages the question might have
been whether atoms were real but today we have a different perspective — the
concept of atom has proved to be so undeniably useful that we can safely assert:
‘real’ is what atoms are.
Naturally, a pragmatic account that denies that a detailed theory of truth is
possible or even necessary will certainly fail to satisfy someone whose interests lie
precisely in the development of such a detailed theory. But for those of us whose
interests lie in most other fields, such as science, the pragmatic account of truth
as a value judgement, as a compliment, may be quite satisfactory — it is all we
need. Indeed, elements of pragmatism are common in 20th century physics but
this is not always sufficiently emphasized. This is the case, for example, for both
Einstein and Bohr despite their otherwise deep and well known disagreements
about the nature of physical laws. Einstein’s realism is remarkably pragmatic.
He deliberately distanced himself from a correspondence notion of truth and
was more concerned with the role of truth for the purpose of inference and
reasoning:
“Truth is a quality we attribute to propositions. When we attribute
this label to a proposition we accept it for deduction. Deduction and
generally the process of reasoning is our tool to bring cohesion to a world
of perceptions. The label ‘true’ is used in such a way that this purpose is
served best.” (quoted in [24], p.90)
Likewise, there is a close affinity between Bohr and the pragmatism of William
James (see [25]):
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“... in our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real
essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible,
relations between the multiple aspects of our experience.” ([26], p.18)
and also
“Owing to the very character of such mathematical abstractions, the for-
malism [of quantum mechanics] does not allow pictorial representation
on accustomed lines, but aims directly at establishing relations between
observations obtained under well-defined conditions.” ([27], p.71)
a position that is clearly pragmatic and supports structuralism.
4 The pragmatic design of probability theory
Science requires a framework for inference on the basis of incomplete informa-
tion. Our first task is to show that the quantitative measures of plausibility or
degrees of belief that are the tools for reasoning should be manipulated and cal-
culated using the ordinary rules of the calculus of probabilities — and therefore
probabilities can be interpreted as degrees of belief.
The procedure we follow differs in one remarkable way from the traditional
way of setting up physical theories. Normally one starts with the mathematical
formalism, and then one proceeds to try to figure out what the formalism might
possibly mean; one tries to append an interpretation to it. This is a very
difficult problem which has affected statistical physics — what is the meaning of
probability and of entropy? — and also quantum theory — what is the meaning
of the wave function? Here we proceed in the opposite order. First we decide
what we are talking about, degrees of belief or degrees of plausibility (we use the
two expressions interchangeably) and then we design rules to manipulate them;
we design the formalism, we construct it to suit our purposes. The advantage
of this pragmatic approach is that the issue of meaning, of interpretation, is
settled from the start.
4.1 Rational beliefs
The terms rational and rationality are loaded with preconceived notions. We
shall use them with a very limited and technical meaning to be explained below.
To start we emphasize that the degrees of belief discussed here are those that
would be held by an idealized “rational” agent who would not be subject to
the practical limitations under which we humans operate. Humans may hold
different beliefs and it is certainly important to figure out what those beliefs
might be — perhaps by observing their gambling behavior — but this is not our
present concern. Our objective is neither to assess nor to describe the subjective
beliefs of any particular individual. Instead we deal with the altogether different
but very common problem that arises when we are confused and we want some
guidance about what we are supposed to believe. Our concern here is not so
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much with beliefs as they actually are, but rather, with beliefs as they ought to
be — at least as they ought to be and still deserve to be called rational. We are
concerned with an ideal standard of rationality that we humans ought to attain
at least when discussing scientific matters.
The challenge is that the concept of rationality is notoriously difficult to
pin down. One thing we can say is that rational beliefs are constrained beliefs.
The essence of rationality lies precisely in the existence of some constraints —
not everything goes. We need to identify some normative criteria of rationality
and the difficulty is to find criteria that are sufficiently general to include all
instances of rationally justified belief. Here is our first criterion of rationality:
The inference framework must be based on assumptions that have wide
appeal and universal applicability.
Whatever guidelines we pick they must be of general applicability — otherwise
they would fail when most needed, namely, when not much is known about a
problem. Different rational agents can reason about different topics, or about
the same subject but on the basis of different information, and therefore they
could hold different beliefs, but they must agree to follow the same rules — and
thus wide appeal is necessary. What we seek here are not the specific rules of
inference that will apply to this or that specific instance; what we seek is to
identify some few features that all instances of rational inference might have in
common.
The second criterion is that
The inference framework must not be self-refuting.
It may not be easy to identify criteria of rationality that are sufficiently general
and precise. Perhaps we can settle for the more manageable goal of avoiding
irrationality in those glaring cases where it is easily recognizable. And this is
the approach we take: rather than providing a precise criterion of rationality
to be carefully followed, we design a framework with the more modest goal of
avoiding some forms of irrationality that are sufficiently obvious to command
general agreement. The basic desire is that the web of rational beliefs must
avoid inconsistencies. If a conclusion can be reached in two different ways the
two ways must agree. As we shall see this requirement turns out to be extremely
restrictive.
Finally,
The inference framework must be useful in practice — it must allow quan-
titative analysis.
Otherwise, why bother? Incidentally, nature might very well transcend a de-
scription in terms of a closed set of mathematical formulas. It is not nature
that demands a mathematical description; it is the pragmatic demand that our
inference schemes — our models — be useful that imposes such a description.
We conclude this brief excursion into rationality with two remarks. First,
we have adopted a technical and very limited but pragmatically useful notion of
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rationality which defines it in terms of avoiding certain obvious irrationalities.
Real humans are seldom rational even in this very limited sense. And second,
whatever specific design criteria are chosen, one thing must be clear: they are
justified on purely pragmatic grounds and therefore they are meant to be only
provisional. The design criteria themselves are not immune to change and im-
provement. Better rational criteria will lead to better scientific theories which
will themselves lead to improved criteria and so on. Thus, the method of science
is not independent from the contents of science.
4.2 Quantifying rational belief
In order to be useful we require an inference framework that allows quantitative
reasoning.6 The first obvious question concerns the type of quantity that will
represent the intensity of beliefs. Discrete categorical variables are not adequate
for a theory of general applicability; we need a much more refined scheme.
Do we believe proposition a more or less than proposition b? Are we even
justified in comparing propositions a and b? The problem with propositions
is not that they cannot be compared but rather that the comparison can be
carried out in too many different ways. We can classify propositions according
to the degree we believe they are true, their plausibility; or according to the
degree that we desire them to be true, their utility; or according to the degree
that they happen to bear on a particular issue at hand, their relevance. We
can even compare propositions with respect to the minimal number of bits that
are required to state them, their description length. The detailed nature of
our relations to propositions is too complex to be captured by a single real
number. What we claim is that a single real number is sufficient to measure
one specific feature, the sheer intensity of rational belief. This should not be
too controversial because it amounts to a tautology: an “intensity” is precisely
the type of quantity that admits no more qualifications than that of being more
intense or less intense; it is captured by a single real number.
However, some preconception about our subject is unavoidable; we need
some rough notion that a belief is not the same thing as a desire. But how
can we know that we have captured pure belief and not belief contaminated
with some hidden desire or something else? Strictly we can’t. We hope that
our mathematical description captures a sufficiently purified notion of rational
belief, and we can claim success only to the extent — again, a pragmatic criterion
— that the formalism proves to be useful.
The inference framework will capture two intuitions about rational beliefs.
First, we take it to be a defining feature of the intensity of rational beliefs that
if a is more believable than b, and b more than c, then a is more believable
than c. Such transitive rankings can be implemented using real numbers and
therefore we are led to claim that
6The argument below follows [28]. It is an elaboration of the pioneering work of Cox [9]
(see also [10]).
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Degrees of rational belief (or, as we shall later call them, probabilities)
are represented by real numbers.
Before we proceed further we need to establish some notation. The following
choice is standard.
Notation
For every proposition a there exists its negation not-a, which will be denoted a˜.
If a is true, then a˜ is false and vice versa.
Given any two propositions a and b the conjunction “a and b” is denoted
ab or a ∧ b. The conjunction is true if and only if both a and b are true.
Given a and b the disjunction “a or b” is denoted by a ∨ b or (less often)
by a+ b. The disjunction is true when either a or b or both are true; it is false
when both a and b are false.
Typically we want to quantify the degrees of belief in a, a∨ b, and ab in the
context of some background information expressed in terms of some proposition
c in the same universe of discourse as a and b. Such propositions we will write
as a|c, a ∨ b|c and ab|c.
The real number that represents the degree of belief in a|b will initially be
denoted [a|b] and later in its more standard form p(a|b) and all its variations.
Degrees of rational belief will range from the extreme value vF that repre-
sents certainty that the proposition is false (for example, for any a, [a˜|a] = vF ),
to the opposite extreme vT that represents certainty that the proposition is
true (for example, for any a, [a|a] = vT ). The transitivity of the ranking scheme
implies that there is a single value vF and a single vT .
The representation of OR and AND
The inference framework is designed to include a second intuition concerning
rational beliefs:
In order to be rational our beliefs in a∨b and ab must be somehow related
to our separate beliefs in a and in b.
Since the goal is to design a quantitative theory, we require that these relations
be represented by some functions F and G,
[a ∨ b|c] = F ([a|c], [b|c], [a|bc], [b|ac]) (1)
and
[ab|c] = G([a|c], [b|c], [a|bc], [b|ac]) . (2)
Note the qualitative nature of this assumption: what is being asserted is the
existence of some unspecified functions F and G and not their specific functional
forms. The same F and G are meant to apply to all propositions; what is being
designed is a single inductive scheme of universal applicability. Note further
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that the arguments of F and G include all four possible degrees of belief in a
and b in the context of c and not any potentially questionable subset.7
The functions F and G provide a representation of the Boolean operations
or and and. The requirement that F and G reflect the appropriate associa-
tive and distributive properties of the Boolean and and or turns out to be
extremely constraining. Indeed, we will show that all allowed representations
are equivalent to each other and that they are equivalent to probability theory:
the associativity of or requires F to be equivalent to the sum rule for proba-
bilities and the distributivity of and over or requires G to be equivalent to the
product rule for probabilities.
Our method will be design by eliminative induction: now that we have iden-
tified a sufficiently broad class of theories — quantitative theories of universal
applicability, with degrees of belief represented by real numbers and the oper-
ations of conjunction and disjunction represented by functions — we can start
weeding the unacceptable ones out.
4.3 The sum rule
Our first goal is to determine the function F that represents or. The space
of functions of four arguments is very large. Without loss of generality we can
narrow down the field to propositions a and b that are mutually exclusive in the
context of some other proposition d. Thus,
[a ∨ b|d] = F ([a|d], [b|d], vF , vF ) , (3)
which effectively restricts F to a function of only two arguments,
[a ∨ b|d] = F ([a|d], [b|d]) . (4)
The restriction to mutually exclusive propositions does not represent a loss of
generality because any two arbitrary propositions can be written as the disjunc-
tion of three mutually exclusive ones,
a ∨ b = [(ab) ∨ (ab˜)] ∨ [(ab) ∨ (a˜b)] = (ab) ∨ (ab˜) ∨ (a˜b) .
Therefore, the general rule for the disjunction a ∨ b of two arbitrary proposi-
tions can be obtained by successive applications of the special rule for mutually
exclusive propositions.
4.3.1 The associativity constraint
As a minimum requirement of rationality we demand that the assignment of
degrees of belief be consistent: if a degree of belief can be computed in two
different ways the two ways must agree. How else could we claim to be rational?
All functions F that fail to satisfy this constraint must be discarded.
7In contrast, [9] sought a representation of AND, [ab|c] = f([a|c], [b|ac]), and negation,
[a˜|c] = g([a|c]).
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Consider any three statements a, b, and c that are mutually exclusive in
the context of a fourth d. The consistency constraint that follows from the
associativity of the Boolean or,
(a ∨ b) ∨ c = a ∨ (b ∨ c) , (5)
is remarkably constraining. It essentially determines the function F . Start from
[a ∨ b ∨ c|d] = F ([a ∨ b|d], [c|d]) = F ([a|d], [b ∨ c|d]) . (6)
Use F again for [a ∨ b|d] and also for [b ∨ c|d], to get
F{F ([a|d], [b|d]) , [c|d]} = F{[a|d], F ([b|d], [c|d])} . (7)
If we call [a|d] = x, [b|d] = y, and [c|d] = z, then
F{F (x, y), z} = F{x, F (y, z)} . (8)
Since this must hold for arbitrary choices of the propositions a, b, c, and d, we
conclude that in order to be of universal applicability the function F must satisfy
(8) for arbitrary values of the real numbers (x, y, z). Therefore the function F
must be associative.
Remark: The requirement of universality is crucial. Indeed, in a universe of
discourse with a discrete and finite set of propositions it is conceivable that the
triples (x, y, z) in (8) do not form a dense set and therefore one cannot conclude
that the function F must be associative for arbitrary values of x, y, and z.
For each specific finite universe of discourse one could design a tailor-made,
single-purpose model of inference that could be consistent, i.e. it would satisfy
(8), without being equivalent to probability theory. However, we are concerned
with designing a theory of inference of universal applicability, a single scheme
applicable to all universes of discourse whether discrete and finite or otherwise.
And the scheme is meant to be used by all rational agents irrespective of their
state of belief — which need not be discrete. Thus, a framework designed for
broad applicability requires that the values of x form a dense set.
4.3.2 The general solution and its regraduation
Equation (8) is a functional equation for F . It is easy to see that there exist an
infinite number of solutions. Indeed, by direct substitution one can easily check
that eq.(8) is satisfied by any function of the form
F (x, y) = φ−1 (φ (x) + φ (y) + β) , (9)
where φ is an arbitrary invertible function and β is an arbitrary constant. What
is not so easy to to show is this is also the general solution, that is, given φ one
can calculate F and, conversely, given any associative F one can calculate the
corresponding φ. The proof of this result is given in [8][9].
The significance of eq.(9) becomes apparent once it is rewritten as
φ (F (x, y)) = φ (x)+φ (y)+β or φ ([a ∨ b|d]) = φ ([a|d])+φ ([b|d])+β. (10)
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This last form is central to any Cox-type approach to probability theory. Note
that there was nothing particularly special about the original representation of
degrees of plausibility by the real numbers [a|d], [b|d], . . . Their only purpose
was to provide us with a ranking, an ordering of propositions according to how
plausible they are. Since the function φ(x) is monotonic, the same ordering can
be achieved using a new set of positive numbers,
ξ(a|d)
def
= φ([a|d]) + β, ξ(b|d)
def
= φ([b|d]) + β, ... (11)
instead of the old. The original and the regraduated scales are equivalent be-
cause by virtue of being invertible the function φ is monotonic and therefore
preserves the ranking of propositions. However, the regraduated scale is much
more convenient because, instead of the complicated rule (9), the or operation
is now represented by a much simpler rule, eq.(10),
ξ (a ∨ b|d) = ξ (a|d) + ξ (b|d) , (12)
which is just a sum. Thus, the new numbers are neither more nor less correct
than the old, they are just considerably more convenient.
Perhaps one can make the logic of regraduation a little bit clearer by consid-
ering the somewhat analogous situation of introducing the quantity temperature
as a measure of degree of “hotness”. Clearly any acceptable measure of “hot-
ness” must reflect its transitivity — if a is hotter than b and b is hotter than
c then a is hotter than c — which explains why temperatures are represented
by real numbers. But the temperature scales can be quite arbitrary. While
many temperature scales may serve equally well the purpose of ordering sys-
tems according to their hotness, there is one choice — the absolute or Kelvin
scale — that turns out to be considerably more convenient because it simplifies
the mathematical formalism. Switching from an arbitrary temperature scale to
the Kelvin scale is one instance of a convenient regraduation. ([8], p. 60)
In the old scale, before regraduation, we had set the range of degrees of belief
from one extreme of total disbelief, [a˜|a] = vF , to the other extreme of total
certainty, [a|a] = vT . At this point there is not much that we can say about the
regraduated ξT = φ(vT ) + β but ξF = φ(vF ) + β is easy to evaluate. Setting
d = a˜b˜ in eq.(12) gives
ξ(a ∨ b|a˜b˜) = ξ(a|a˜b˜) + ξ(b|a˜b˜)⇒ ξF = 2ξF , (13)
and therefore
ξF = 0 . (14)
4.3.3 The general sum rule
As mentioned earlier the restriction to mutually exclusive propositions in the
sum rule eq.(12) can be easily lifted noting that for any two arbitrary proposi-
tions a and b we have
a ∨ b = (ab) ∨ (ab˜) ∨ (a˜b) = a ∨ (a˜b) (15)
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Since each of the two terms on the right are mutually exclusive the sum rule
(12) applies,
ξ(a ∨ b|d) = ξ(a|d) + ξ(a˜b|d) + [ξ(ab|d)− ξ(ab|d)]
= ξ(a|d) + ξ(ab ∨ a˜b|d)− ξ(ab|d) , (16)
which leads to the general sum rule,
ξ(a ∨ b|d) = ξ(a|d) + ξ(b|d)− ξ(ab|d) . (17)
4.4 The product rule
Next we consider the function G in eq.(2) that represents and. Once the original
plausibilities are regraduated by φ according to eq.(11), the new function G for
the plausibility of a conjunction reads
ξ(ab|c) = G[ξ(a|c), ξ(b|c), ξ(a|bc), ξ(b|ac)] . (18)
The space of functions of four arguments is very large so we first narrow it down
to just two. Then we require that the representation of and be compatible with
the representation of or that we have just obtained. This amounts to imposing
a consistency constraint that follows from the distributive properties of the
Boolean and and or. A final trivial regraduation yields the product rule of
probability theory.
The derivation proceeds in two steps. First, we separately consider special
cases where the function G depends on only two arguments, then three, and
finally all four arguments. Using commutivity, ab = ba, the number of possibil-
ities can be reduced to seven:
ξ(ab|c) = G(1)[ξ(a|c), ξ(b|c)]
ξ(ab|c) = G(2)[ξ(a|c), ξ(a|bc)]
ξ(ab|c) = G(3)[ξ(a|c), ξ(b|ac)]
ξ(ab|c) = G(4)[ξ(a|bc), ξ(b|ac)]
ξ(ab|c) = G(5)[ξ(a|c), ξ(b|c), ξ(a|bc)]
ξ(ab|c) = G(6)[ξ(a|c), ξ(a|bc), ξ(b|ac)]
ξ(ab|c) = G(7)[ξ(a|c), ξ(b|c), ξ(a|bc), ξ(b|ac)]
It is rather straightforward to show [28][8] that the only functions G that are
viable candidates for a general theory of inductive inference are equivalent to
type G(3),
ξ(ab|c) = G[ξ(a|c), ξ(b|ac)] . (19)
The and function G will be determined by requiring that it be compatible
with the regraduated or function F , which is just a sum. Consider three state-
ments a, b, and c, where the last two are mutually exclusive, in the context of
a fourth, d. Distributivity of and over or,
a (b ∨ c) = ab ∨ ac , (20)
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implies that ξ (a (b ∨ c) |d) can be computed in two ways,
ξ (a (b ∨ c) |d) = ξ ((ab|d) ∨ (ac|d)) . (21)
Using eq.(12) and (19) leads to
G[ξ (a|d) , ξ (b|ad) + ξ (c|ad)] = G[ξ (a|d) , ξ (b|ad)] +G[ξ (a|d) , ξ (c|ad)] ,
which we rewrite as
G (u, v + w) = G (u, v) +G (u,w) , (22)
where ξ (a|d) = u, ξ (b|ad) = v, and ξ (c|ad) = w.
To solve the functional equation (22) we first transform it into a differential
equation. Differentiate with respect to v and w,
∂2G (u, v + w)
∂v∂w
= 0 , (23)
and let v + w = z, to get
∂2G (u, z)
∂z2
= 0 , (24)
which shows that G is linear in its second argument,
G(u, v) = A(u)v + B(u) . (25)
Substituting back into eq.(22) gives B(u) = 0. To determine the function A(u)
we note that the degree to which we believe in ad|d is exactly the degree to
which we believe in a|d by itself. Therefore,
ξ(a|d) = ξ(ad|d) = G[ξ(a|d), ξ(d|ad)] = G[ξ(a|d), ξT ] , (26)
where ξT denotes complete certainty. Equivalently,
u = A(u)ξT ⇒ A(u) =
u
ξT
. (27)
Therefore,
G (u, v) =
uv
ξT
or
ξ (ab|d)
ξT
=
ξ (a|d)
ξT
ξ (b|ad)
ξT
. (28)
The constant ξT is easily regraduated away: just normalize ξ to p = ξ/ξT .
The corresponding regraduation of the sum rule, eq.(17) is equally trivial. The
degrees of belief ξ range from total disbelief ξF = 0 to total certainty ξT . The
corresponding regraduated values are pF = 0 and pT = 1.
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4.5 Probabilities
In the regraduated scale the and operation is represented by a simple product
rule,
p (ab|d) = p (a|d) p (b|ad) , (29)
and the or operation is represented by the sum rule,
p (a ∨ b|d) = p (a|d) + p (b|d)− p(ab|d) . (30)
Degrees of belief p measured in this particularly convenient regraduated scale
will be called “probabilities”. The degrees of belief p range from total disbelief
pF = 0 to total certainty pT = 1.
To summarize:
A state of partial knowledge — a web of interconnected rational beliefs
— is mathematically represented by quantities that are to be manipulated
according to the rules of probability theory. Degrees of rational belief are
probabilities.
Other equivalent representations are possible but less convenient; the choice is
made on purely pragmatic grounds.
On meaning, ignorance and randomness
The product and sum rules can be used as the starting point for a theory of
probability: Quite independently of what probabilities could possibly mean,
we can develop a formalism of real numbers (measures) that are manipulated
according to eqs.(29) and (30). This is the approach taken by Kolmogorov. The
advantage is mathematical clarity and rigor. The disadvantage, of course, is
that in actual applications the issue of meaning, of interpretation, turns out to
be important because it affects how and why probabilities are used. It affects
how one sets up the equations and it even affects our perception of what counts
as a solution.
The advantage of the approach described above is that the issue of meaning
is clarified from the start: the theory was designed to apply to degrees of belief.
Consistency requires that these numbers be manipulated according to the rules
of probability theory. This is all we need. There is no reference to measures of
sets or large ensembles of trials or even to random variables. This is remarkable:
it means that we can apply the powerful methods of probability theory to rea-
soning about problems where nothing random is going on, and to single events
for which the notion of an ensemble is either absurd or at best highly contrived
and artificial. Thus, probability theory is the method for consistent reason-
ing in situations where the information available might be insufficient to reach
certainty: probability is the tool for coping with uncertainty and ignorance.
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The degree-of-belief interpretation can also be applied to the probabilities of
random variables. It may, of course, happen that there is an unknown influence
that affects a system in unpredictable ways and that there is a good reason
why this influence remains unknown, namely, that it is so complicated that the
information necessary to characterize it cannot be supplied. Such an influence
we can call ‘random’. Thus, being random is just one among many possible
reasons why a quantity might be uncertain or unknown.
5 What is information?
The term ‘information’ is used with a wide variety of different meanings (see
e.g., [1] [8] [10] [29] [30] [31]). There is the Shannon notion of information, which
is meant to measure an amount of information and is quite divorced from se-
mantics. There is also an algorithmic notion of information, which captures the
notion of complexity and originates in the work of Solomonov, Kolmogorov and
Chaitin. Here we develop an epistemic notion of information that is somewhat
closer to the everyday colloquial use of the term — roughly, information is what
we seek when we ask a question.
It is not unusual to hear that systems “carry” or “contain” information or
that “information is physical”. This mode of expression can perhaps be traced to
the origins of information theory in Shannon’s theory of communication. We say
that we have received information when among the vast variety of messages that
could conceivably have been generated by a distant source, we discover which
particular message was actually sent. It is thus that the message “carries”
information. The analogy with physics is immediate: the set of all possible
states of a physical system can be likened to the set of all possible messages,
and the actual state of the system corresponds to the message that was actually
sent. Thus, the system “conveys” a message: the system “carries” information
about its own state. Sometimes the message might be difficult to read, but it is
there nonetheless.
This language — information is physical — useful as it has turned out to
be, does not exhaust the meaning of the word ‘information’. The goal of Shan-
non’s information theory, or better, communication theory, is to characterize
the sources of information, to measure the capacity of the communication chan-
nels, and to learn how to control the degrading effects of noise. It is somewhat
ironic but nevertheless true that this “information” theory is unconcerned with
the central Bayesian issue of how messages affect the beliefs of rational agents.
A fully Bayesian information theory demands an explicit account of the
relation between information and the beliefs of ideally rational agents. The
connection arises as follows. Implicit in the recognition that most of our beliefs
are held on the basis of incomplete information is the idea that our beliefs would
be “better” if only we had more information. Indeed, it is a presupposition of
thought itself that some beliefs are better than others — otherwise why go
through the trouble of thinking? Therefore a theory of probability demands a
theory for updating probabilities.
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The concern with ‘good’ and ‘better’ bears on the issue of whether proba-
bilities are subjective, objective, or somewhere in between. We can argue that
what makes one probability assignment better than another is that it better
reflects something “objective” about the world. The adoption of better be-
liefs has real consequences: they provide a better guidance about how to cope
with the world, and in this pragmatic sense, they provide a better guide to
the “truth”. Probabilities are useful to the extent that they incorporate some
degree of objectivity.
On the other hand all probability assignments involve judgements and there-
fore some subjectivity is unavoidable. The long controversy over the objective
or subjective nature of probabilities arises from accepting the sharp dichotomy
that they are either one or the other with no room for intermediate positions.
The Gordian knot is cut by simply declaring that the dichotomy is false. What
we have is something like a spectrum. Some subjectivity is inevitable but objec-
tivity is the desirable goal. The procedure for enhancing objectivity is through
appropriate updating mechanisms that allow us to process information and in-
corporate its objective features into our beliefs. Barring some pathological cases
Bayes’ rule behaves precisely in this way. Indeed, as more and more data are
taken into account the original (possibly subjective) prior becomes less and less
relevant, and all rational agents become more and more convinced of the same
truth. This is crucial: were it not this way Bayesian reasoning would not be
deemed acceptable.
To set the stage for the discussion below assume that we have received a
message — but the carrier of information could equally well have been input
from our senses or data from an experiment. If the message agrees with our
prior beliefs we can safely ignore it. The message is boring; it carries no news;
literally, for us it carries no information. The interesting situation arises when
the message surprises us; it is not what we expected. A message that disagrees
with our prior beliefs presents us with a problem that demands a decision. If the
source of the message is not deemed reliable then the contents of the message
can be safely ignored — it carries no information; it is no different from noise.
On the other hand, if the source of the message is deemed reliable then we have
an opportunity to improve our beliefs — we ought to update our beliefs to agree
with the message. Choosing between these two options requires a decision, a
judgement. The message (or the sensation, or the data) becomes “information”
precisely at that moment when as a result of our evaluation we feel that our
beliefs require revision.
We are now ready to address the question: What, after all, is ‘information’?
The main observation is that the result of being confronted with new information
is to restrict our options as to what we are honestly and rationally allowed to
believe. This, I propose, is the defining characteristic of information.
Information, in its most general form, is whatever affects and therefore
constrains rational beliefs.
Since our objective is to update from a prior distribution to a posterior when
new information becomes available we can state that
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New information is what forces a change of rational beliefs.
New information is a set of constraints on the family of acceptable posterior
distributions. Our definition captures an idea of information that is directly
related to changing our (rational) minds: information is the driving force behind
the process of learning. Incidentally, note that although we did not find it
necessary to talk about amounts of information, whether measured in units
of bits or otherwise, our notion of information will allow precise quantitative
calculations. Indeed, constraints on the acceptable posteriors are precisely the
kind of information the method of maximum entropy (to be developed below)
is designed to handle.
An important aspect of this epistemic notion of information is that the
identification of what qualifies as information — as opposed to mere noise —
already involves a judgement, an evaluation; it is a matter of facts as much as a
matter of values. Furthermore, once a certain proposition has been identified as
information, the revision of beliefs acquires a moral component; it is no longer
optional: it becomes a moral imperative.
The act of updating is a type of dynamics — the study of change. In New-
tonian dynamics the state of motion of a system is described in terms of its
momentum — the “quantity” of motion — while the change from one state to
another is explained in terms of an applied force. Similarly, a state of belief is
described in terms of probabilities — a “quantity” of belief — and the change
from one state to another is due to information. Just as a force or an impulse is
that which induces a change from one state of motion to another, so information
is that which induces a change from one state of belief to another. Updating is
a form of dynamics — and vice versa: in [7] quantum dynamics is derived as an
updating of probabilities subject to the appropriate information/constraints.
What about prejudices and superstitions? What about divine revelations?
Do they constitute information? Perhaps they lie outside our restriction to the
beliefs of ideally rational agents, but to the extent that their effects are indistin-
guishable from those of other sorts of information, namely, they affect beliefs,
they should qualify as information too. False information is information too.
Assessing whether the sources of such information are reliable or not can be a
difficult problem. In fact, even ideally rational agents can be affected by false
information because the evaluation that assures them that the data was compe-
tently collected or that the message originated from a reliable source involves an
act of judgement that is not completely infallible. Strictly, all judgements that
constitute the necessary first step of one inference process, are themselves the
end result of a previous inference process that is not immune from uncertainty.
What about limitations in our computational power? Such practical limi-
tations are unavoidable and they do influence our inferences. Should they be
considered information? No. Limited computational resources may affect the
numerical approximation to the value of, say, an integral, but they do not affect
the actual value of the integral. Similarly, limited computational resources may
affect the approximate imperfect reasoning of real agents and real computers
but they do not affect the reasoning of those ideal rational agents that are the
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subject of our present concerns.
6 The design of entropic inference
Once we have decided, as a result of the confrontation of new information with
old beliefs, that our beliefs require revision the problem becomes one of deciding
how precisely this ought to be done. First we identify some general features of
the kind of belief revision that one might consider desirable, of the kind of
belief revision that one might count as rational. Then we design a method,
a systematic procedure, that implements those features. To the extent that
the method performs as desired we can claim success. The point is not that
success derives from our method having achieved some intimate connection to
the inner wheels of reality; success just means that the method seems to be
working. Whatever criteria of rationality we choose, they are meant to be only
provisional — they are not immune from further change and improvement.
Typically the new information will not affect our beliefs in just one propo-
sition — in which case the updating would be trivial. Tensions immediately
arise because the beliefs in various propositions are not independent; they are
interconnected by demands of consistency — the sum and product rules we de-
rived earlier. Therefore the new information also affects our beliefs in all those
“neighboring” propositions that are directly linked to it, and these in turn af-
fect their neighbors, and so on. The effect can potentially spread over the whole
network of beliefs; it is the whole web of beliefs that must be revised.
The one obvious requirement is that the updated beliefs ought to agree with
the newly acquired information. Unfortunately, this requirement, while neces-
sary, is not sufficiently restrictive: we can update in many ways that preserve
both internal consistency and consistency with the new information. Additional
criteria are needed. What rules is it rational to choose?
6.1 General criteria
The rules are motivated by the same pragmatic design criteria that motivate
the design of probability theory itself — universality, consistency, and practical
utility. But this is admittedly too vague; we must be more specific about the
precise way in which they are implemented.
6.1.1 Universality
The goal is to design a method for induction, for reasoning when not much is
known. In order for the method to perform its function we must impose that it
be of universal applicability. Consider the alternative: We could design methods
that are problem-specific, and employ different induction methods for different
problems. Such a framework, unfortunately, would fail us precisely when we
need it most, namely, in those situations where the information available is so
incomplete that we do not know which method to employ.
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We can argue this point somewhat differently: It is quite conceivable that
different situations could require different problem-specific induction methods.
What we want to design here is a general-purpose method that captures what
all those problem-specific methods have in common.
6.1.2 Parsimony
To specify the updating we adopt a very conservative criterion that recognizes
the value of information: what has been laboriously learned in the past is valu-
able and should not be disregarded unless rendered obsolete by new information.
The only aspects of one’s beliefs that should be updated are those for which new
evidence has been supplied. Thus we adopt a
Principle of Minimal Updating: Beliefs should be updated only to the ex-
tent required by the new information.
The special case of updating in the absence of new information deserves special
attention. It states that when there is no new information an ideally rational
agent should not change its mind.8 In fact, it is difficult to imagine any notion
of rationality that would allow the possibility of changing one’s mind for no
apparent reason. This is important and it is worthwhile to consider it from a
different angle. Degrees of belief, probabilities, are said to be subjective: two
different individuals might not share the same beliefs and could conceivably
assign probabilities differently. But subjectivity does not mean arbitrariness. It
is not a blank check allowing the rational agent to change its mind for no good
reason.
Minimal updating offers yet another pragmatic advantage. As we shall see
below, rather than identifying what features of a distribution are singled out
for updating and then specifying the detailed nature of the update, we will
adopt design criteria that stipulate what is not to be updated. The practical
advantage of this approach is that it enhances objectivity — there are many
ways to change something but only one way to keep it the same.
The analogy with mechanics can be pursued further: if updating is a form
of dynamics, then minimal updating is a form of inertia. Rationality and ob-
jectivity demand a considerable amount of inertia.
6.1.3 Independence
The next general requirement turns out to be crucially important: without it
the very possibility of scientific theories would not be possible. The point is
that in every scientific model, whatever the topic, if it is to be useful at all, we
must assume that all relevant variables have been taken into account and that
whatever was left out — the rest of the universe — does not matter. To put
it another way: in order to do science we must be able to understand parts of
8We refer to ideally rational agents who have fully processed all information acquired in the
past. Humans do not normally behave this way; they often change their minds by processes
that are not fully conscious.
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the universe without having to understand the universe as a whole. Granted, it
is not necessary that the understanding be complete and exact; it must just be
adequate for our purposes.
The assumption, then, is that it is possible to focus our attention on a suit-
ably chosen system of interest and neglect the rest of the universe because they
are “sufficiently independent”. Thus, in any form of science the notion of sta-
tistical independence must play a central and privileged role. This idea — that
some things can be neglected, that not everything matters — is implemented
by imposing a criterion that tells us how to handle independent systems. The
requirement is quite natural: Whenever two systems are a priori believed to
be independent and we receive information about one it should not matter if
the other is included in the analysis or not. This amounts to requiring that
independence be preserved unless information about correlations is explicitly
introduced.9
Again we emphasize: none of these criteria are imposed by Nature. They
are desirable for pragmatic reasons; they are imposed by design.
6.2 Entropy as a tool for updating probabilities
Consider a variable x the value of which is uncertain; x can be discrete or
continuous, in one or in several dimensions. It could, for example, represent
the possible microstates of a physical system, a point in phase space, or an
appropriate set of quantum numbers. The uncertainty about x is described by
a probability distribution q(x). Our goal is to update from the prior distribution
q(x) to a posterior distribution P (x) when new information becomes available.
The information is in the form of a set of constraints that defines a family {p(x)}
of acceptable distributions and the question is: which distribution P ∈ {p}
should we select?
Our goal is to design a method that allows a systematic search for the pre-
ferred posterior distribution. The central idea, first proposed in [16],10 is dis-
armingly simple: to select the posterior first rank all candidate distributions
in increasing order of preference and then pick the distribution that ranks the
highest. Irrespective of what it is that makes one distribution preferable over
another (we will get to that soon enough) it is clear that any ranking according
to preference must be transitive: if distribution p1 is preferred over distribution
p2, and p2 is preferred over p3, then p1 is preferred over p3. Such transitive
rankings are implemented by assigning to each p(x) a real number S[p] in such
a way that if p1 is preferred over p2, then S[p1] > S[p2]. The functional S[p] will
be called the entropy of p. The selected distribution (one or possibly many, for
there may be several equally preferred distributions) is that which maximizes
9The independence requirement is rather subtle and one must be careful about its precise
implementation. The robustness of the design is shown by exhibiting an alternative version
that takes the form of a consistency constraint: Whenever systems are known to be independent
it should not matter whether the analysis treats them jointly or separately. [8][18]
10[16] deals with the more general problem of ranking positive additive distributions which
also include, e.g., intensity distributions.
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the entropy functional.
The importance of this particular approach to updating distributions cannot
be overestimated: it implies that the updating method will take the form of a
variational principle — the method of Maximum Entropy (ME) — involving a
certain functional — the entropy — that maps distributions to real numbers and
that is designed to be maximized. These features are not imposed by Nature;
they are all imposed by design. They are dictated by the function that the ME
method is supposed to perform. (Thus, it makes no sense to seek a generalization
in which entropy is a complex number or a vector; such a generalized entropy
would just not perform the desired function.)
Next we specify the ranking scheme, that is, we choose a specific functional
form for the entropy S[p]. Note that the purpose of the method is to update
from priors to posteriors so the ranking scheme must depend on the particular
prior q and therefore the entropy S must be a functional of both p and q.
The entropy S[p, q] describes a ranking of the distributions p relative to the
given prior q. S[p, q] is the entropy of p relative to q, and accordingly S[p, q]
is commonly called a relative entropy. This is appropriate and sometimes we
will follow this practice. However, since all entropies are relative, even when
relative to a uniform distribution, the qualifier ‘relative’ is redundant and can
be dropped.
The functional S[p, q] is designed by a process of elimination — a process
of eliminative induction. First we state the desired design criteria; this is the
crucial step that defines what makes one distribution preferable over another.
Then we analyze how each criterion constrains the form of the entropy. As we
shall see the design criteria adopted below are sufficiently constraining that there
is a single entropy functional S[p, q] that survives the process of elimination.
This approach has a number of virtues. First, to the extent that the design
criteria are universally desirable, then the single surviving entropy functional
will be of universal applicability too. Second, the reason why alternative entropy
candidates are eliminated is quite explicit — at least one of the design criteria
is violated. Thus, the justification behind the single surviving entropy is not that
it leads to demonstrably correct inferences, but rather, that all other candidate
entropies demonstrably fail to perform as desired.
6.3 Specific design criteria
Three criteria and their consequences for the functional form of the entropy are
given below. Proofs are given in [8].
6.3.1 Locality
DC1 Local information has local effects.
Suppose the information to be processed does not refer to a particular subdo-
main D of the space X of xs. In the absence of any new information about D the
PMU demands we do not change our minds about probabilities that are con-
ditional on D. Thus, we design the inference method so that q(x|D), the prior
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probability of x conditional on x ∈ D, is not updated. The selected conditional
posterior is11
P (x|D) = q(x|D) . (31)
We emphasize: the point is not that we make the unwarranted assumption that
keeping q(x|D) unchanged is guaranteed to lead to correct inferences. It need
not; induction is risky. The point is, rather, that in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary there is no reason to change our minds and the prior information
takes precedence.
The consequence of DC1 is that non-overlapping domains of x contribute
additively to the entropy,
S[p, q] =
∫
dxF (p(x), q(x), x) , (32)
where F is some unknown function — not a functional, just a regular function
of three arguments.
Comment:
If the variable x is continuous the criterion DC1 requires that information
that refers to points infinitely close but just outside the domain D will have
no influence on probabilities conditional on D. This may seem surprising as it
may lead to updated probability distributions that are discontinuous. Is this a
problem? No.
In certain situations (e.g., physics) we might have explicit reasons to believe
that conditions of continuity or differentiability should be imposed and this
information might be given to us in a variety of ways. The crucial point, however
— and this is a point that we keep and will keep reiterating — is that unless
such information is in fact explicitly given we should not assume it. If the new
information leads to discontinuities, so be it.
Comment: Bayes’ rule
The locality criterion DC1 includes Bayesian conditionalization as a special
case. Indeed, if the information is given through the constraint p(D) = 1 — or
more precisely p(D˜) = 0 where D˜ is the complement of D so that the information
does not directly refer to D — then P (x|D) = q(x|D), which is known as
Bayesian conditionalization. More explicitly, if θ is the variable to be inferred
on the basis of information about a likelihood function q(x|θ) and observed data
x′, then the update from the prior q to the posterior P ,
q(x, θ) = q(x)q(θ|x)→ P (x, θ) = P (x)P (θ|x) (33)
consists of updating q(x) → P (x) = δ(x − x′) to agree with the new data and
invoking the PMU so that P (θ|x′) = q(θ|x′) remains unchanged. Therefore,
P (x, θ) = δ(x− x′)q(θ|x) . (34)
11We denote priors by q, candidate posteriors by lower case p, and the selected posterior by
upper case P .
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Marginalizing over x gives
P (θ) = q(θ|x′) = q(θ)
q(x′|θ)
q(x′)
, (35)
which is Bayes’ rule. Thus, entropic inference is designed to include Bayesian
inference as a special case. Note however that imposing locality is not identical
to imposing Bayesian conditionalization — locality is more general because it
is not restricted to absolute certainties such as p(D) = 1.
6.3.2 Coordinate invariance
DC2 The system of coordinates carries no information.
The points x ∈ X can be labeled using any of a variety of coordinate systems.
In certain situations we might have explicit reasons to believe that a particular
choice of coordinates should be preferred over others and this information might
have been given to us in a variety of ways, but unless it was in fact given we
should not assume it: the ranking of probability distributions should not depend
on the coordinates used.
The consequence of DC2 is that S[p, q] can be written in terms of coordinate
invariants such as dxm(x) and p(x)/m(x), and q(x)/m(x):
S[p, q] =
∫
dxm(x)Φ
(
p(x)
m(x)
,
q(x)
m(x)
)
. (36)
Thus the single unknown function F which had three arguments has been re-
placed by two unknown functions: Φ which has two arguments, and the density
m(x).
To grasp the meaning of DC2 it may be useful to recall some facts about
coordinate transformations. Consider a change from old coordinates x to new
coordinates x′ such that x = Γ(x′). The new volume element dx′ includes the
corresponding Jacobian,
dx = γ(x′)dx′ where γ(x′) =
∣∣∣∣ ∂x∂x′
∣∣∣∣ . (37)
Let m(x) be any density; the transformed density m′(x′) is such that m(x)dx =
m′(x′)dx′. This is true, in particular, for probability densities such as p(x) and
q(x), therefore
m(x) =
m′(x′)
γ(x′)
, p(x) =
p′(x′)
γ(x′)
and q(x) =
q′(x′)
γ(x′)
. (38)
The coordinate transformation gives
S[p, q] =
∫
dxF (p(x), q(x), x)
=
∫
γ(x′)dx′ F
(
p′(x′)
γ(x′)
,
q′(x′)
γ(x′)
,Γ(x′)
)
, (39)
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which is a mere change of variables. The identity above is valid always, for all Γ
and for all F ; it imposes absolutely no constraints on S[p, q]. The real constraint
arises from realizing that we could have started in the x′ coordinate frame, in
which case we would have ranked the distributions using the entropy
S[p′, q′] =
∫
dx′ F (p′(x′), q′(x′), x′) , (40)
but this should have no effect on our conclusions. This is the nontrivial content
of DC2. It is not that we can change variables, we can always do that; but rather
that the two rankings, the one according to S[p, q] and the other according to
S[p′, q′] must coincide. This requirement is satisfied if, for example, S[p, q] and
S[p′, q′] turn out to be numerically equal, but this is not necessary.
6.3.3 Locality (again)
Next we determine the density m(x) by invoking the locality criterion DC1 once
again. A situation in which no new information is available is dealt by allowing
the domain D to cover the whole space of xs, D = X and DC1 requires that in
the absence of any new information the prior conditional probabilities should
not be updated, P (x|X ) = q(x|X ) or P (x) = q(x). Thus, when there are no
constraints the selected posterior distribution should coincide with the prior
distribution, which is expressed as
DC1′ When there is no new information there is no reason to change one’s
mind and one shouldn’t.
The consequence of DC1′ (a second use of locality) is that the arbitrariness
in the density m(x) is removed: up to normalization m(x) must be the prior
distribution q(x), and therefore at this point we have succeeded in restricting
the entropy to functionals of the form
S[p, q] =
∫
dx q(x)Φ
(
p(x)
q(x)
)
. (41)
6.3.4 Independence
DC3 When two systems are a priori believed to be independent and we receive
independent information about each then it should not matter whether one
is included in the analysis of the other or not.
Consider a composite system, x = (x1, x2) ∈ X = X1 × X2. Assume that all
prior evidence led us to believe the systems were independent. This belief is
expressed through the prior distribution: if the individual priors are q1(x1) and
q2(x2), then the prior for the whole system is q1(x1)q2(x2). Further suppose
that new information is acquired such that q1(x1) would by itself be updated
to P1(x1) and that q2(x2) would be itself be updated to P2(x2). DC3 requires
that S[p, q] be such that the joint prior q1(x1)q2(x2) updates to the product
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P1(x1)P2(x2) so that inferences about one system do not affect inferences about
the other.
The consequence of DC3 is that the remaining unknown function Φ is de-
termined to be Φ(z) = −z log z. Thus, probability distributions p(x) should be
ranked relative to the prior q(x) according to their relative entropy,
S[p, q] = −
∫
dx p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
. (42)
Comment:
We emphasize that the point is not that when we have no evidence for
correlations we draw the firm conclusion that the systems must necessarily be
independent. They could indeed have turned out to be correlated and then our
inferences would be wrong. Induction involves risk. The point is rather that
if the joint prior reflected independence and the new evidence is silent on the
matter of correlations, then the prior takes precedence and there is no reason
to change our minds. This is parsimony in action: a feature of the probability
distribution — in this case, independence — will not be updated unless the
evidence requires it.
6.4 The ME method
At this point our conclusions are summarized as follows:
The ME method: We want to update from a prior distribution q to a poste-
rior distribution when there is new information in the form of constraints
C that specify a family {p} of allowed posteriors. The posterior is selected
through a ranking scheme that recognizes the value of prior information,
the irrelevance of choice of coordinates, and the privileged role of inde-
pendence. Within the family {p} the preferred posterior P is that which
maximizes the relative entropy S[p, q] subject to the available constraints.
No interpretation for S[p, q] is given and none is needed.
We emphasize that the logic behind the updating procedure does not rely on
any particular meaning assigned to the entropy, either in terms of information,
or heat, or disorder. Entropy is merely a tool for inductive inference; we do not
need to know what entropy means; we only need to know how to use it.
The derivation above has singled out a unique S[p, q] to be used in inductive
inference. Other “entropies” such as those associated with the names of Renyi
or Tsallis might turn out to be useful for other purposes — perhaps as measures
of some kinds of information, or measures of discrimination or distinguishability
among distributions, or of ecological diversity, or for some altogether different
function — but they are unsatisfactory for the purpose of updating in the sense
that they do not perform according to the design criteria DC1-3.
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6.5 Deviations from maximum entropy
There is one last issue that must be addressed before one can claim that the de-
sign of the method of entropic inference is more or less complete. Higher entropy
represents higher preference but there is nothing in the previous arguments to
tell us by how much. Suppose the maximum of the entropy function is not par-
ticularly sharp, are we really confident that distributions that are ranked close
to the maximum are totally ruled out? We want a quantitative measure of the
extent to which distributions with lower entropy are ruled out. The discussion
below follows [32].
The problem is to update from a prior q(x) given information specified by
certain constraints C. The constraints C specify a family of candidate distribu-
tions p(x) = p(x|θ) which can be conveniently labelled with some finite number
of parameters θi, i = 1 . . . n. Thus, the parameters θ are coordinates on a
statistical manifold Θn specified by C. The distributions in this manifold are
ranked according to their entropy S[p, q] = S(θ) and the preferred posterior is
the distribution p(x|θ0) that maximizes the entropy S(θ).
The question we now address concerns the extent to which p(x|θ0) should
be preferred over other distributions with lower entropy or, to put it differently:
To what extent is it rational to believe that the selected value ought to be the
entropy maximum θ0 rather than any other value θ? This is a question about
the probability p(θ) of various values of θ.
The original problem which led us to design the ME method was to assign
a probability to x; we now see that the full problem is to assign probabilities
to both x and θ. We are concerned not just with p(x) but rather with the joint
distribution pJ(x, θ); the universe of discourse has been expanded from X (the
space of xs) to the product space X ×Θn (the space of xs and θs).
To determine the joint distribution pJ(x, θ) we make use of essentially the
only method at our disposal — the ME method itself — but this requires that
we address the two standard preliminary questions: first, what is the prior
distribution, what do we know about x and θ before we receive the information
in the constraints C? And second, how do handle this new information C that
constrains the allowed pJ(x, θ)?
This first question is the subtler one: when we know absolutely nothing
about the θs we do not know how they are related to the xs, and we know
neither the constraints C nor the space Θn they determine. At best we just
know that the θs are points in some unspecified space ΘN of sufficiently large
dimension N . A joint prior that reflects this state of ignorance is a product,
qJ(x, θ) = q(x)µ(θ). We will assume that the prior over x is known — it is
the same prior we had used when we updated from q(x) to p(x|θ0). We will
also assume that µ(θ) represents a uniform distribution, that is, it assigns equal
probabilities to equal volumes in ΘN .
Next we tackle the second question: what are the constraints on the allowed
joint distributions pJ (x, θ) = p(θ)p(x|θ)? The new information is that the θs
are not any arbitrary points in some unspecified large space ΘN but are instead
constrained to lie on the smaller subspace Θn that represents those distributions
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p(x|θ) satisfying the constraints C. This space Θn is a statistical manifold and
there exists a natural measure of distance given by the information metric gij .
The corresponding volume elements are given by g
1/2
n (θ)dnθ, where gn(θ) is the
determinant of the metric [8] [33]. Therefore, on the constraint manifold Θn the
uniform prior for θ is proportional to g
1/2
n (θ) and the corresponding joint prior
is qJ (x, θ) = q(x)g
1/2
n (θ).
To select the preferred joint distribution P (x, θ) we maximize the joint en-
tropy S[pJ , qJ ] over all distributions of the form pJ(x, θ) = p(θ)p(x|θ) with
θ ∈ Θn. It is convenient to write the joint entropy as
S[pJ , qJ ] = −
∫
X×Θn
dx dnθ p(θ)p(x|θ) log
p(θ)p(x|θ)
g
1/2
n (θ)q(x)
= −
∫
Θn
dnθ p(θ) log
p(θ)
g
1/2
n (θ)
+
∫
Θn
dnθ p(θ)S(θ), (43)
where
S[p, q] = S(θ) = −
∫
X
dx p(x|θ) log
p(x|θ)
q(x)
. (44)
Then, maximizing (43) with respect to variations δp(θ) such that
∫
dnθ p(θ) = 1,
yields
0 =
∫
Θn
dnθ
(
− log
p(θ)
g1/2(θ)
+ S(θ) + log ζ
)
δp(θ) . (45)
(The required Lagrange multiplier has been written as 1 − log ζ.) Therefore
the probability that the value of θ should lie within the small volume dVn =
g
1/2
n (θ)dnθ is
P (θ)dnθ =
1
ζ
eS(θ)dVn with ζ =
∫
Θn
dVn e
S(θ). (46)
Equation (46) is the result we seek. It tells us that, as expected, the preferred
value of θ is the value θ0 that maximizes the entropy S(θ), eq.(44), because this
maximizes the scalar probability density expS(θ).12 It also tells us the degree
to which values of θ away from the maximum θ0 are ruled out.
The previous discussion allows us to refine our understanding of the ME
method. ME is not an all-or-nothing recommendation to pick that single distri-
bution that maximizes entropy and rejects all others. The ME method is more
nuanced: in principle all distributions within the constraint manifold ought to
be included in the analysis; they contribute in proportion to the exponential of
their entropy and this turns out to be significant in situations where the entropy
maximum is not particularly sharp.
Going back to the original problem of updating from the prior q(x) given
information that specifies the manifold {p(x|θ)}, the preferred update within
12The density expS(θ) is a scalar function; it is the probability per unit invariant volume
dV = g
1/2
n (θ)d
nθ.
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the family {p(x|θ)} is p(x|θ0), but to the extent that other values of θ are not
totally ruled out, a better update is obtained marginalizing the joint posterior
PJ(x, θ) = P (θ)p(x|θ) over θ,
PME(x) =
∫
Θn
dnθ P (θ)p(x|θ) =
∫
Θn
dVn
eS(θ)
ζ
p(x|θ) . (47)
In situations where the entropy maximum at θ0 is very sharp we recover the old
result,
PME(x) ≈ p(x|θ0) . (48)
When the entropy maximum is not very sharp eq.(47) is the more honest update.
The summary description of the ME method in the previous subsection can
now be refined by adding the following line:
The ME posterior PME is a weighted average of all distributions in the
family {p} specified by the constraints C. Each p is weighted by the expo-
nential of its entropy S[p, q].
Physical applications of the extended MEmethod are ubiquitous. For macro-
scopic systems the preference for the distribution that maximizes S[p, q] can be
overwhelming but for small systems such fluctuations about the maximum are
common. Thus, violations of the second law of thermodynamics can be seen
everywhere — provided we know where to look. For example, eq.(46) agrees
with Einstein’s theory of thermodynamic fluctuations and extends it beyond the
regime of small fluctuations. Another important application, developed in [7],
is quantum mechanics — the ultimate theory of small systems.
7 Summary
Science requires a framework for inference on the basis of incomplete informa-
tion. We showed how to design tools to represent a state of partial knowledge
as a web of interconnected beliefs with no internal inconsistencies; the result-
ing scheme is probability theory. Then we argued that in a properly Bayesian
framework the concept of information must be defined in terms of its effects on
the beliefs of rational agents. The definition we have proposed – that informa-
tion is a constraint on rational beliefs – is convenient for two reasons. First,
the information/belief relation is explicit, and second, such information is ide-
ally suited for quantitative manipulation using entropic methods. Finally, we
designed a method for updating probabilities. The design criteria are strictly
pragmatic; the method aims to be of universal applicability, it recognizes the
value of information both old and new, and it recognizes the special status that
must be accorded to considerations of independence in order to build models
that are actually usable. The result — the maximum entropy or ME method
— is a framework in which entropy is the tool for updating probabilities. The
ME method unifies both MaxEnt and Bayes’ rule into a single framework of
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inductive inference and allows new applications. Indeed, much as the old Max-
Ent method provided the foundation for statistical mechanics, recent work has
shown that the extended ME method provides an entropic foundation for quan-
tum mechanics.
Within an informational approach it is not possible to sharply separate the
subject matter or contents of science from the inductive methods of science;
science includes both. This point of view has two important consequences. The
first is that just as we accept that the contents of science will evolve over time,
to the extent that contents and methods are not separable, we must also accept
that the inference methods are provisional too — the best we currently have —
and are therefore susceptible to future change and improvement.
The second consequence stems from the observation that experiments do not
vindicate individual propositions within a theory; they vindicate the theory as
a whole. Therefore, when a theory turns out to be pragmatically successful we
can say that it is not just the contents of the theory that have been corroborated
but also its methods of inference. Thus, the ultimate justification of the entropic
methods of inference resides in their pragmatic success when confronted with
experiment.
8 Discussion
The accidents of history have caused the term ‘pragmatism’ to acquire conno-
tations that are not fully satisfactory. But we do not have to literally adopt
Peirce’s version of pragmatism or James’ or Putnam’s. It is not necessary that
we agree with everything or even most of what these authors have said; not only
did they not agree with each other, but their views evolved, and their later views
disagreed with those held in their own youth. Instead, the proper pragmatic
attitude is to pick and choose useful bits and pieces and try to stitch them into
a coherent framework. To the extent that this framework turns out to be useful
we have succeeded and that is all we need.
The vague notion of truth that I have favored — truth as a compliment —
is not Peirce’s. It might be closer to James’ or Putnam’s and even Einstein’s
— but it need not be identical to their notions either: the real purpose is not a
theory of truth itself but rather those applications that may be tackled through
a pragmatically designed framework for inference. In other words, the theory
of truth is not the real goal; it is only an intermediate obstacle, perhaps even a
distraction, on the way to the real problems: Can we do quantum mechanics?
Can we do economics? Or, borrowing Floridi’s words, can we “model the world
in such a way to make sense of it and withstand its impact”?
I have argued in favor of an informational pragmatic realism but I have not
attempted its systematic development. Some of its features can be summarized
as follows: There is a world out there which we must navigate. Physical models
are inference schemes; they are instruments to help us succeed. Within such
models we find elements that purport to represent entities such as particles or
fields. We also find other elements that are tools for manipulating information—
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probabilities, entropies, wave functions. All models inevitably involve concepts
and categories of our own construction chosen for our own pragmatic reasons.
To the extent that a model is reliably successful we say that its entities are real.
Beyond that it is meaningless to assert that these entities enjoy any special
relation to the world that might be described as “referring” or “corresponding”
to something independent of us.
Within the informational approach to science the notion of a structural real-
ism in which the world consists of relations and structures only — without any
entities or objects — makes no sense. The information or lack thereof is infor-
mation about something — both the entities and the informational tools must
appear in the models. Having said that, the central point of the informational
approach to physics [5] [7] [8] is precisely that the formal rules for manipulating
information — Bayesian and entropic methods — place such strong constraints
on the formal structure of theories that a label of informational structural prag-
matic realism may, in the end, be quite appropriate.
Therefore I welcome Floridi’s reconciliation of the epistemic and the (non-
eliminativist) ontic versions of structural realism. Indeed, the recognition that a
model describes a structure at a given level of abstraction brings Floridi close to
Putnam’s internal realism. ‘Internal’ because the entities and structures in our
world are defined within a given level of abstraction or conceptual framework
which is chosen by us for our purposes. And ‘realism’ because the conceptual
framework is not arbitrary; it is not independent of the world; the chosen entities
and structures have to be useful and succeed in the real world. An important
difference, however, is that Putnam’s internal realism makes no mention of
information. This is the gap that can hopefully be closed by the informational
pragmatic realism advocated here.
Another aspect of Floridi’s structural realism that I find appealing is the
idea that the distinction between what constitutes intrinsic nature and what
constitutes structure is not easily drawn — that relata are not logically prior
to relations, that they come together, all or nothing, in a single package. Such
an idea is already deeply ingrained in physics. For example, a quantity such as
electric charge refers on one hand to an intrinsic property of a particle — an
electron without its charge would just not be an electron — and on the other
hand electric charge describes interactions, the relations of the particle to other
charged particles. It is totally inconceivable to claim that a particle could possi-
ble have an electric charge and yet not interact with other particles according to
the laws of electromagnetism. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to assert that
an electron is, to use Floridi’s term, a structural object — its intrinsic properties
are defined by the structure of its relations to other particles. Furthermore, as
shown in [7] the electric interactions can indeed be approached from a purely
informational perspective. They are described through information — that is,
constraints — on the allowed motions that the particle can undertake.
The definition of information that I have proposed — information as a con-
straint on rational beliefs — differs from Floridi’s definition as well-formed,
meaningful, and truthful data. But there is considerable overlap. Indeed, within
the entropic/Bayesian framework a mere set of numbers — or data — does not
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by itself constitute information. It is necessary that the data be embedded
within a model. This is what endows the data with significance, with meaning.
The model provides a connection between the data and the other quantities one
wishes to infer — a relation that is usually established through what in statistics
is called a likelihood function. Moreover, as discussed in section 5, the data be-
comes “information” precisely at that moment when we feel justified in allowing
its effects to propagate throughout the web of beliefs. Such data deserve the
compliment ‘true’. And thus data is information provided it is well-formed and
meaningful by virtue of being embedded in a model, and is truthful by virtue
of an appropriate judgement.
Pragmatism is a form of empiricism too, at least in the sense that,
“...it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning mat-
ters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future
experience...” ([34], p.vii)
van Fraasen’s empiricism, either in its earlier form of constructive empiricism or
in the later form of empiricist structuralism, appears to adopt a correspondence
model of truth and this places him squarely in the anti-realist camp. Never-
theless, if we ignore the labels and just look at what he actually wrote we find
significant points of contact with both structural and pragmatic realism. van
Fraasen has argued that in a semantic approach to theories as mathematical
models if one mathematical structure can represent the phenomena then any
other isomorphic structure can also do it:
“...models represent nature only up to isomorphism – they only represent
structure.” [35]
This has been called the underdetermination problem but we will, more op-
timistically, regard it as an opportunity. It offers the possibility of imposing
additional pragmatic virtues such as explanatory power, simplicity, etc., that
go beyond mere empirical adequacy, as criteria for the acceptance of theories.
This opportunity has been advantageously pursued by Ellis [22], and Floridi
([1], p.358-360). van Fraasen too recognizes that the acceptance of a theory
rests on pragmatic considerations that go beyond mere belief in empirical ade-
quacy. ([13], p. 12-13).
From our pragmatic perspective two of van Fraasen’s ideas appear particu-
larly appealing. One has to do with clarifying the meaning of empirical adequacy
[35] [36]. The problem is that under a correspondence model of truth one might
naively attempt to achieve an agreement between the model and the phenomena
as they are in themselves — which leads to the same old problem of reference.
van Fraasen skillfully evades this problem by asserting that empirical adequacy
is not adequacy to the phenomena-in-themselves but rather to the phenomena
as described by us. This is as pragmatic as it gets! Empirical adequacy involves
the comparison of two descriptions; one is supplied by the theory and the other
is our description — a “data model” — of certain selectively chosen aspects that
are relevant to our interests, a description in terms of concepts invented by us
because they are adequate to our purposes. van Fraasen sums up as follows:
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“... in a context in which a given model is my representation of a phe-
nomenon, there is no difference between the question of whether a the-
ory fits that representation and the question of whether it fits the phe-
nomenon.” [36]
It is difficult to imagine that either James or Putnam would have objected.
The second appealing idea concerns the transition from an older theory to a
newer theory that is presumably better — van Fraasen calls it the issue of royal
succession in science [12]. This topic was briefly mentioned in section 1 with
reference to the pessimistic meta-induction and the no-miracles arguments.
Any systematic procedure for theory revision would naturally attempt to
preserve those features of the old theory that made it work. Which leads to the
question “what makes a good theory good?” Whatever it is — it could perhaps
be that it captures the correct structure — we can call it “true” or “real” but
this is just a name, a compliment that merely indicates success. Explaining the
predictive success of science by “realism” or by “truth” is somewhat analogous
to explaining that opium will put you to sleep because it has “dormitive” powers.
Instead I find van Fraasen’s pragmatic argument much more persuasive. The
success of science is not a miracle — it is a matter of how scientific theories are
designed: beyond retaining the empirical successes of the old theory we want
more and the new theory must provide us with new empirical successes. This
is a necessary requirement for the new theory to be accepted. Thus today’s
science is bound to be more successful than yesterday’s — otherwise we would
not have made the switch.
Within the pragmatic framework advocated here royal succession is ex-
plained by adopting a relaxed form of van Fraasen’s criteria. The acceptance
criteria are extended beyond mere empirical success to include other pragmatic
virtues: the new theory must retain the pragmatic successes of the old and add
a few of its own. The point is that it is not strictly necessary that the new
theory must lead to new empirical successes; it might, for example, just lead to
better explanations, or be more computationally convenient.
I conclude that an informational pragmatic realism has the potential of in-
corporating many valuable pragmatic insights derived from internal realism,
informational structural realism and empiricist structuralism into a single co-
herent doctrine and thereby close the gap between them.
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